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ABSTRACT 
While many factors have been studied in relation to the functioning of land markets, the role of land 
distribution has received relatively little attention. In this paper, we ask to what extent farmers’ 
propensity to buy land is related to the difference between them and their neighbours in terms of land 
ownership. To this end, we employ the concept of relative deprivation. Drawing on micro-level data 
from the transition period in Poland and using both OLS and instrumental variables strategy, we find 
that interpersonal comparisons with others in one’s reference group may have motivated a farmer’s 
behaviour in the land market. In particular, the propensity to purchase land is positively associated 
with experiencing higher relative deprivation. In addition, this relationship waned over time in a 
predictable manner: late in the transition period it was weaker than at the beginning of the period.   
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Does it matter how much land 
your neighbour owns?  
The functioning of land markets in Poland 
from a social comparison perspective 
Jan Fałkowski* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 59/August 2013 
1. Introduction 
Debates concerning the functioning of land markets have a long history in agricultural and 
development economics and a number of issues related to land sales/purchases or land 
rentals have been studied (for a comprehensive literature review see Deininger and Feder, 
2001; and Otsuka, 2007). Some scholars looked at land sales/purchases transactions in the 
context of welfare or poverty analysis and focused on the impact of land transfers on 
productivity and/or efficiency of resource allocation (see e.g. Deininger et al., 2009 and 
citations therein). An interesting part of this research studied transactions on land markets in 
relation to other markets’ imperfections (credit, insurance or labour; see e.g. Eswaran and 
Kotwal, 1986; Carter and Olinto, 2003; Yao, 2000; Vranken and Swinnen, 2006). Other 
papers concentrated on the equity aspects and looked at the effect that land sales/purchases 
may have on land concentration (see e.g. Binswanger et al., 1995; Banerjee et al., 2002).1  
Nevertheless, despite the fact that determinants and consequences of farmers’ behaviour on 
land sales/purchases markets have been extensively studied, surprisingly little is known to 
what extent a decision to purchase land could be an effect of social comparisons: i.e. to what 
extent individuals are motivated to buy more land if others in their reference group have 
larger land endowments. This is in contrast to the long-established argument by economists 
that an individual’s behaviour is affected by his or her neighbours’ behaviour (see e.g. 
Markowitz, 1952; Becker, 1974; Clark and Oswald, 1996 or earlier works by John Stuart Mill 
or Thorstein Veblen). This is also in contrast to the existing evidence emphasising the role of 
social groups in affecting farmers' behaviour or subjective well-being (see e.g. Kuehne, 2013 
or Van Landeghem et al., 2013). Further, some studies document that farmers often display 
various symbols (of one's farming ability or recent purchases of agricultural equipment) to 
influence neighbouring farmers' opinions or behaviours (Seabrook and Higgins, 1988; Egoz 
et al., 2001; Burton, 2004).2  
                                                        
* Jan Fałkowski, University of Warsaw and CEAPS (jfalkowski@wne.uw.edu.pl). 
This research has been conducted within the Factor Markets project co-financed by the European 
Commission and the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The author would like to thank 
Bogdan Buks for the data, Natalia Jabłonowska, Paulina Kwaśniewska and Olga Sykut for their 
assistance with the data and Alfons Balmann, David Bullock, Alan Matthews, Oded Stark, Jo Swinnen 
and conference/seminar participants in Trento, Kiel and Seville for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 Yet another perspective is offered in papers that study land markets in relation to governments’ 
regulations and their role in enlarging or limiting the scope of land sales markets (see e.g. Ciaian et al., 
2012). Related but distinct strand of the literature studies the capitalisation of subsidies into land 
values (see e.g. Kilian and Salhofer, 2008; Kirwan, 2009; Ciaian and Kancs, 2012). 
2 While referring to a distinct but related issue, one can also mention here a qualitative evidence 
pointing to farmers deriving a substantial source of satisfaction with their own farming ability from 
observing neighbouring farms in poor conditions (Burton, 2004).  
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This evidence suggests that farmers’ utility does not depend solely on individual 
achievements but also on how are they perceived within the local community. It also allows 
to assume that farmers’ behaviour may be influenced by interpersonal comparisons. What we 
try to argue in this paper is that these comparisons could be of particular importance as 
regards farmers’ attitude to land and, consequently, as regards farmers’ behaviour on land 
markets. The rationale for looking at the functioning of land markets from the social 
comparisons’ perspective is that, except for the widely recognised role of land as a productive 
resource, its importance often goes beyond its function as a means of production. Land may 
serve as collateral or perform an essential role as a social safety net. Further, and perhaps 
more importantly given our focus, land ownership is often a source of political power 
(Binswanger et al., 1995; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2008; Baland and 
Robinson, 2008; Baldwin, 2013) and can be indicative of individuals’ socio-economic status 
and a source of individuals' identity (Platteau, 2000; Burton, 2004; Cheshire et al., 2013; 
Kuehne, 2013). Therefore, people may want to accumulate land not only because of its 
economic value but also because it may grant them additional benefits, including the 
enhancement of their prestige and social status within the community. In that case it is 
reasonable to assume that they would like to maintain at least the same level of land 
endowments as what is common in their social group. One could therefore hypothesise that 
individual’s propensity to purchase land will be stronger if he/she has less land endowments 
than his/her peers from the reference group. Since in majority of cases these political and 
social functions are tied to ownership of land, owning rather than renting land could be of 
special importance.  
That said, in this paper we try to have a closer look at whether farmers’ participation in land 
transactions is driven, at least partly, by concerns about their relative position. In other 
words, we want to see whether participation in land markets is undertaken to improve an 
individual's or a household's comparative position with respect to a specific reference group. 
To do so, we investigate farmers’ behaviour in land markets in Poland, a country where for 
many reasons the smooth operation of land markets has been widely advocated. Well 
functioning land markets have often been quoted as a potential remedy to a number of 
problems undermining growth potential of local rural areas. The role of land transactions in 
overcoming the problem of huge land fragmentation, or facilitating structural change that 
would help to solve the problem of agrarian overpopulation could serve here as examples3. Its 
potential role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation and thus reducing the rural-
urban income gape should also be recognised4. For the reasons mentioned above our focus is 
on land owning and therefore on land purchases rather than land rentals. 
More specifically, we analyse household-level data from 74 Polish villages. We look at three 
waves of the survey conducted in 1992, 1996 and 2000. While our data are not panel 
observations, we are able, though to a limited extent, to control for dynamic effects at the 
household level, as each wave provides retrospective information on the events that 
happened four years earlier. Most importantly, we are able to document some associations 
between interpersonal comparisons in year t0 and farmers' behaviour in land markets in the 
next four years (t0; t0+4).  
What should also be noted is that the three waves of our survey cover the first decade of the 
transition process which started in 1989 after the Poles have overthrown communism. What 
follows, we are able to investigate the functioning of land markets during the first decade 
after Poland abandoned a centrally planned economy and moved to a market economy. This 
is important for three main reasons. First, our data cover the period when the land markets 
have only started to function. Under communist regime land markets were structurally 
                                                        
3 According to Eurostat, in 2007, agricultural holdings smaller than 5 ha accounted in Poland for 
roughly 68% of the total number of agricultural holdings. For comparison, in Germany, this share was 
23%, in France 25% and in the Netherlands 28%.   
4 Average disposable income per capita of rural households in Poland is close to 70 percent of the 
average income in urban areas and has remained at this level for the last decade (GUS, 2013).  
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blocked (Halamska, 2001; Gorlach, 1989). In consequence, only after 1989 farmers gained 
some freedom to use land markets to optimise their land holdings subject to both economic 
and non-economic values of land. It is interesting therefore to see whether these latter values 
mattered or not. Second, our dataset enables us to see whether the relative position 
considerations, if any, affected farmers’ behaviour in differentiated way over time. As noted 
by Bryant (1999) or Johnsen (2004), social relations in rural areas have been a subject of a 
thorough reorganisation related to modernisation and globalisation processes. What follows, 
with the onset of a market economy, traditional relationships, attitudes and behaviours might 
have changed over time. In consequence, one could hypothesise that non-economic 
advantages of owning land might have been the largest at the beginning of the transition 
period and then, gradually, have been losing their importance with time. Third, whereas we 
are able to trace dynamic effects at the household level only to a very limited extent (thanks 
to using the retrospective information), having observations from four points in time we are 
able to highlight dynamic effects at the village level. More specifically, we are able to control 
for changes in local land distribution. Given that we are interested in assessing whether 
farmers’ motivation to participate in land markets are, at least partly, driven by their relative 
land endowments, this fact presents an important advantage. We use this characteristic in 
our empirical strategy when we refer to an instrumental variables approach.  
While the contemporary literature attempted to investigate a number of various aspects 
related to the fact that individuals’ behaviour may be a result of social comparison (examples 
include, for instance, papers on education decisions – Sacerdote, 2000, on retirement 
savings decisions – Duflo and Saez, 2002; on migration decisions – Stark, 1984; Stark and 
Taylor, 1991; or on technology adoption – Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995) to best of our 
knowledge this paper is the first to highlight relative effects in the context of land 
transactions5. The closest paper to ours is that by Van Landeghem et al. (2013) who study the 
impact of land distribution on subjective well-being in Moldova. Other paper related to our 
work is that by Breustadt and Habermann (2011). These authors try to introduce 
neighbourhood effects in land markets operation by investigating the spatial relationships 
among rental prices of neighbouring farmers. Nevertheless the focus of these studies is very 
different from ours as none of them attempted to estimate the impact of social comparison on 
farms’ propensity to participate in land markets transactions. Moreover, to measure the 
impact of interpersonal comparisons on farmers' propensity to buy land, we apply a 
particular index of social dismay, namely the relative deprivation index. This index has been 
extensively used in studies related to migration (recent works using this measure include, for 
example, Stark and Fan, 2011; Stark and Hyll, 2011; or Stark et al., 2012). To best of our 
knowledge, however, it has not been widely used in the agricultural economics literature. We 
are also not aware of any study that would apply this index to land assets.  
Our basic estimates are obtained from a logit model. We test the robustness of these 
estimates to changing the econometric specification (to a linear probability model) and the 
estimation sample. Further, to address potential concerns related to the omitted variables 
bias we also apply an instrumental variables strategy. Subject to some caveats discussed 
below, our results consistently show that interpersonal comparisons with people from the 
relevant reference group may indeed motivate farmer's behaviour in land markets. More 
specifically, we document a positive association between an index of relative deprivation in 
land assets and one's propensity to purchase land. Secondly, in accordance with expectations, 
this relationship waned over time and was weaker at the end than at the beginning or in the 
middle of 1990s.  
                                                        
5 This is not to say that neighbours’ effects have not been studied in agricultural economics literature. 
However, they were investigated from a different perspective. For instance, Karagiannis and 
Tzouvelekas (2012) analyse TFP changes attributed to spillover effects arising from neighbours’ use of 
preventive inputs. Libby and Sharp (2003) look at the social capital between farming and non-farming 
neighbours to investigate rural-urban interface, whereas Holloway and Lapar (2007) investigate the 
so-called neighbourhood effect for the entry decisions of Filipino small-holders.  
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The reminder of the paper is as follows. Section II presents some background discussion on 
the attitude of Polish farmers to land. This is to show that non-economic values of land have 
indeed mattered for local farmers' behaviour and thus to motivate our research question. 
Section III describes the data. Section IV presents our econometric strategy whereas section 
V reports and discusses the results. Finally, section VI concludes.  
2. The attitude of Polish farmers towards the land  
In this section we provide background information on the attitude of Polish farmers to land 
with the purpose in mind of providing the rationale for our analysis. We also review some of 
the relevant literature.  
Understanding the current role of land in Poland requires referring to some historical facts. 
This is because local agrarian relations have been deeply rooted in complex interlinkages 
between culture, politics and economics. The latter in turn have been evolving over time and 
taking different forms depending on circumstances. We focus here on the main developments 
in the 20th century and refer the reader to Kochanowicz (1989) for an excellent survey of the 
debate concerning earlier times.  
One of the key features to note at the very beginning is that before the Second World War, 
after which Poland came under communist rule, its agrarian system was characterised by a 
dual structure where small-scale peasantry farms co-existed alongside large estates owned by 
landed class, 'ziemiaństwo' (Mieszczankowski, 1960). These two groups differed in all 
respects including the way they perceived the role of their land. For smallholders the land 
was predominantly means for providing self-employment opportunities and a source of food 
security. Yet, as argued by Halamska (2001), except for being a matter of survival, land was 
also a guarantor of a relative autonomy of peasant families. Consequently, its role went 
beyond a mere production factor. For landed class on the other hand, land, except for 
providing income, was a symbol of social position. As Kochanowicz (2008, p. 10) argues "[...] 
landed estates had their non-economic value as well, a remnant of the Old Order, when 
land ownership was as much a matter of material wealth as of the social status".  
These non-economic values of land continued to be important after the Second World War. 
However, the dual character of the Polish agrarian system and the functions performed by 
land changed with the onset of the communism.6 Already in the second half of the 1940s, 
communists introduced a land reform. As a result, the property of larger landowners was 
expropriated, and the estates were parcelled out and sub-divided into plots that were 
distributed to smallholders and the landless population. As a consequence, land distribution 
was shifted towards the left, resulting in a decreased share of land cultivated by larger 
holdings and an increased share of land farmed by smallholders (Jezierski i Petz, 1988). 
Further, starting from the late 1940s and early 1950s, the communist authorities started to 
push through the idea of a Soviet model of collective farming (Dobieszewski, 1993). 
Notwithstanding the state’s efforts in this field however, Polish farmers resisted and land 
remained predominantly in private hands.7 This observation is crucial to understand yet 
another dimension in the attitude of Polish farmers towards the land. As noted by Gorlach 
(1989, p.23), family farm was “an important battlefield in Polish society’s fight for its 
independence of the communist system. The private farm has crippled the Communist 
system in Poland, making it incomplete and weaker than in many other countries where the 
Communists seized power.” As such, having private land could have been perceived as a 
                                                        
6 In this context, the fact that landed elites, together with the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, and the 
upper middle class, became the victims of harsh persecutions pursued on both the territory invaded by 
the German Nazis and the parts invaded by the Soviet Union should also be acknowledged 
(Kochanowicz, 2008). The shift of the state’s territory (roughly 300 km to the west) after the Second 
World War, as decided by the great powers, should also be kept in mind.   
7 Unlike in other socialist countries from the region, in Poland only about 25% of agricultural land was 
operated by the state or cooperative farms before 1990. 
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symbol of the opposition against the communists. Also Halamska et al. (2003) describe 
farmers' attitudes towards the land under communism as predominantly political. These 
authors note also that this attitude went well beyond the traditionally debated deep 
attachment of farmers to land which could be linked to various cultural aspects, such as 
family traditions. As argued by Halamska (2001, p. 26), this political character of ownership 
“was decisive for the social position of owners in the real socialism society the principle of 
which was that ownership has a collectivist and political character (Staniszkis, 1989)”. To 
further confirm this view one can quote other studies from the beginning of the transition 
period which identified land as an important factor determining social prestige in rural areas 
(Styk, 1993; Drozd-Piasecka, 1991).8 Finally, the studies by Gorlach (1990) or Halamska 
(2001) could be recalled, both of which note that although the attitude towards the land 
under communism was evolving it never lost its non-economic components.  
When talking about the attitude of farmers to land under communism, there is yet another 
important characteristic that should be mentioned. This relates to complex relationships 
between family farms and the state in the period 1945-1989. Gorlach (1989) describes these 
relationships as ‘repressive tolerance’. As the communists could not break private farmers’ 
resistance to collectivisation, they had to tolerate them. At the same time, however, they 
oppressed them hindering their development, regardless of the fact that property was in 
farmers’ hands. For example, numerous restrictions were introduced to land markets 
operations. Farmers were also encouraged to transfer land to the state. For instance, “since 
1968 farmers could get pensions but only if they turned over the land to the state” 
(Kochanowicz, 2008, p. 17). This resulted in a situation where the “turnover on the land 
market was small and the dominating form of taking over the land was inheritance. In a 
sense, a naturalisation of the attitude towards the land took place maintaining its special 
patrimonial value and certainly made it difficult to treat the land as just an agricultural 
factor of production” (Halamska, 2001, p. 27). These accounts additionally point to a deep 
attachment of farmers to land, a fact that has been extensively debated in a more general 
literature (see e.g. Gray, 1998; Hildebrand and Hennon, 2005; or Kuehne, 2013).  
We now move to briefly describe the changes that have taken place in the attitudes towards 
land in Poland in the last two decades, i.e. after the overthrow of the communism. To start 
with, it should be noted that the dual character (with semi-subsistence farms on the one hand 
and large estates on the other) has been slowly restored. However, two important features 
should be acknowledged. Firstly, the small-scale farmers lost their exceptional position of 
private owners that they had under the communism. Secondly, there no longer exists a 
landed class. One may therefore ask the question whether land can still be perceived as a 
source of social status or as a means of conveying any other non-economic values.  
There is no doubt that during the last two decades economic aspects of land ownership have 
gained in importance and this does not refer only to the role that land plays as an input to 
agricultural production. Land has more and more speculative value (as urban demand rises) 
or serves as a store of wealth (which should also be seen in the context of direct payments 
introduced in Poland after it joined the EU in May 2004; for a similar argument and evidence 
from the EU countries see, for instance, Killian and Salhofer, 2008; or Ciaian and Kancs, 
2012). These observations seem to indicate that, especially with time, land ownership might 
have lost an important part of its non-economic functions (see also Kochanowicz, 2008, for a 
related discussion).  
Yet, as argued by many scholars in the New Institutional Economics literature, while social 
norms and informal institutions evolve, considerable time is needed for them to really change 
(see e.g. Williamson, 2000). This in turn would suggest that the symbolic role of land, 
whether social or political, is unlikely to disappear in the near future. This approach seems to 
                                                        
8 The opposite opinions, such as that by Jagiełło-Łysiowa (1969), noting the diminishing role of non-
economic functions of land (especially in the eyes of younger generations) should also be 
acknowledged.  
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harmonise with the evidence on the attitudes to land by Polish farmers in the transition 
period. Works from the beginning of the transition period (Fedyszak-Radziejowska, 1992; 
Gorlach i Seręga, 1995) as well as the more recent studies (Halamska, 2001; Halamska et al., 
2003), admit that the attitude towards the land has started to evolve after moving to a market 
economy. They nevertheless emphasise that farm households and land have maintained their 
role in facilitating status acquisition. This state of affairs has been strengthened by the 
problems that some people had with pulling themselves together in the transition process 
and, in consequence, had to return to rural areas and farming because they did not succeed in 
other jobs.  
Overall therefore, the short historical overview sketched above allows us to argue that over 
the last century land has certainly had an important non-economic value for Polish farmers. 
While factors impacting these values have varied, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
importance of land resulted as much from its role as a production factor as from its role for 
expressing social or political position. At the same time, however, it could be argued that the 
rapid modernisation of rural areas that is related to the move to a market economy in 1989 
has reorganised the traditional characteristics of agrarian and rural communities. As a result, 
the role of these non-economic values of land in driving farmers’ behaviour might, at least 
partly, have weakened with time.  
These observations form the basis for two hypotheses that will be verified in the remainder of 
the text. The first one refers to the fact that farmers may want to maintain land for expressing 
their social or political position and states that farmers' propensity to purchase land will be 
positively associated with the fact that they have less land endowments than their peers in the 
relevant reference group. The second hypothesis argues that the effect of these relative 
considerations and interpersonal comparisons with respect to land endowments should have 
been weaker at the end rather than at the beginning or in the middle of 1990s. Below we aim 
at providing some evidence to document this relationship and check whether the social 
comparison motive, or its antecedents from the past, was still present in shaping farmers’ 
decisions to participate in land purchases transactions in Poland during 1990s.  
3. Data 
We use household survey data from 74 villages in Poland. The survey was meant to be 
representative at the country level. As mentioned earlier, we use the information from three 
waves of this survey conducted subsequently in 1992, 1996 and 2000. Depending on a year, 
our dataset contains from roughly 3,900 to 4,200 observations. Approximately 10% to 15% of 
the records had to be dropped due to missing data. Accordingly, in our econometric 
modelling we use roughly from 3,300 to 3,800 observations, depending on a year and the 
estimation specification.  
Unfortunately these data are not panel observations. However, except for questions related to 
the situation in the year of conducting the survey, in each wave some questions were asked 
concerning events dating back four years. This presents a two-fold advantage. Firstly, we are 
also able to reconstruct data on land endowments in 1988, so the year just before the onset of 
the transition period and thus just before the land markets started to operate more freely. 
Secondly, thanks to these retrospective questions, we are able to capture some of the 
dynamics at the household level. More specifically, we are able to see the change in land 
endowments over the period t0 and t0+4. As a result, we can investigate to what extent the 
distaste for relative deprivation as regards land endowments in the year t0 affected a farmer's 
behaviour in land markets in the period (t0; t0+4).  
What is important is the fact that all farming households within the surveyed villages were 
approached. This makes our dataset particularly suitable for studying social comparisons as 
our sample contains immediate neighbours who are likely to constitute a natural reference 
group for each other. Obviously the coverage of the farming population in villages surveyed is 
not 100% as some of these households refused to answer the questionnaire. Nevertheless we 
can be sure that our sample contains a substantial share of relevant peer groups with whom 
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farmers compare themselves. This presents an important advantage over other studies that 
often investigate the phenomenon of social comparisons in larger administrative units and 
thus may suffer from measurement error related to the fact that the reference group is 
defined over too large entities.  
Our dataset contains detailed information on land market transactions. Given our focus, this 
feature of our dataset presents an important advantage. However, it has also an important 
disadvantage. The main problem is that, while offering considerable information on land 
issues, our dataset has a rather limited coverage of other socio-economic characteristics of 
the surveyed households. We try to minimise this problem by using various econometric 
techniques (see below). Nevertheless this shortcoming should be kept in mind when 
interpreting our results.  
4. Econometric strategy 
In order to analyse the impact of relative deprivation effects on the propensity to buy land in 
Poland in the 1990s, we adopt three approaches. First, given the dichotomous nature of our 
dependent variable, we use a simple logit model. Second, to test the robustness of logit 
results to the econometric specification and the estimation sample, we use ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method. Third, to address the potential problem stemming from the omitted 
variables, we use an instrumental variables strategy. Below, we briefly present and justify 
these approaches.  
Based on the existing theoretical literature, farmers' propensity to participate in land 
purchases transactions could be thought of as a function:   
 ݌௜௥ ൌ ܹሺ ௜ܺ௥ሻ (1) 
where p denotes the variable that characterises farmer's behaviour on land market and X are 
the socio-economic characteristics, both referring to farm i, and village r. W(.) is the reduced-
form function that aims at capturing potentially complex interactions between these two. X 
includes, for instance, farm's access to credit, number of household members or initial land 
endowments. Given our focus, it includes also a measure of a potential dismay from having 
less land resources than other people living in the same village (see further).  
The mapping from socioeconomic characteristics into behaviour on land markets induced by 
(1) can be studied empirically. To do this, consider the following empirical model for the ith 
farm in village r of the form:   
 ݌௜௥ ൌ ߙ௥ ൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௥ ൅ ߝ௜௥ (2) 
where ߙ௥ is a village fixed effects and ߝ௜௥ is an error term. ߚ is a vector of coefficients to be 
estimated.  
As mentioned earlier, our dataset allows us to trace the changes in land owned over the four-
year periods 1988-1992; 1992-1996 and 1996-2000. Therefore, we estimate the model 
presented in (2) using each of these three datasets. Accordingly, for each wave, we code our 
dependent variable as a dummy variable equal to one if the household bought land on the 
market during this four-year time span and equal to zero if no such transactions were 
recorded.  
As regards the set of our covariates, the main variable of interest tries to measure a social 
dismay that an individual experiences due to the fact that some members of his/her reference 
group have higher land endowments than him/her. To capture potential distaste for falling 
behind other members of the relevant reference group, we refer to the concept of relative 
deprivation (see e.g. Stark and Yitzhaki, 1988; Stark and Taylor, 1991). More specifically, we 
calculate the relative deprivation index with respect to land endowments. For a given 
individual with land endowments li this index measures the fraction of those in the reference 
group whose land endowments are higher than li times their mean excess of land. The 
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specific formula to calculate this relative deprivation index of an individual from population 
n whose land endowments are li is as follows:  
 ( ) [1 ( )] ( | )i i i iRD l F l E l l l l= − − >  (3) 
where F(li) is the fraction of those in the population whose land endowments are smaller than 
or equal to li and it is understood that for an individual with the highest land endowments, 
RD(ln), is equal to zero. What should be noted is that our measure refers to the initial relative 
deprivation observed at the beginning of the four-year period that we cover in a given survey. 
In other words, our dependent variable captures farmers' behaviour in the period (t0;t0+4), 
whereas our relative deprivation measure is observed at time t0. Therefore, the impact of 
relative deprivation in land assets on farmers' behaviour on land markets is evaluated by 
looking at the relative deprivation from the time preceding the decision to purchase land was 
made. Thanks to this we can assume that what we estimate is the effect of relative deprivation 
on farmer's behaviour and not vice-versa. 
Other explanatory variables included in X aim at capturing other important factors that are 
likely to affect farmer's propensity to participate in land purchases transactions. The choice of 
these variables is based on the relevant literature, subject to the data availability. Most 
importantly, we control for households’ total area (including land rented from others and 
excluding land rented to others), which we expect to positively affect a farmer's propensity to 
buy land. This is because in the presence of high land fragmentation, and that is precisely 
what we observe in Poland, it is reasonable to assume that larger farms may benefit from 
some economies of scale, which in turn may make them more favourable to further land 
acquisitions.9 This positive relationship could also be expected on at least two other grounds. 
Firstly, land concentration is a likely outcome in the presence of speculative purchases. 
Consequently, if land markets performance is, at least to some extent, driven by speculative 
motives then farm area should positively affect the incidence of land purchases. Secondly, 
land concentration is a likely scenario in the presence of credit market imperfections: either 
because large farms may have better access to external funds needed for farm investments (as 
they can use their land as collateral), or because small holders have to resort to distress sales 
having no chances to get credit (Binswanger et al., 1995; Kranton and Swamy, 1999). 
Therefore, if credit markets are imperfect, then again a positive relationship between land 
endowments and land purchases could be expected.10  
Given the potential role of access to credit for farmer's behaviour on land markets, we also 
include two direct measures to capture these phenomena. On the one hand, we include a 
dummy variable distinguishing households that received credit within the four-year periods 
preceding our surveys. On the other hand, we also include a dummy equal to one for 
households whose requests to be granted external funding over the similar period were 
refused. In accordance with the existing empirical evidence indicating that access to credit 
may be indispensible for financing land purchases, we expect the coefficient on the former 
(latter) variable to be positive (negative). Further, to proxy for labour assets we control for 
the number of household members and we expect a positive coefficient on this variable.11 The 
reason for this is that, especially at the beginning of the transition period, Polish farmers 
have had only limited opportunities to benefit from non-agricultural activities. Moreover, 
agrarian overpopulation and a resulting land hunger have been an intrinsic specificity of the 
Polish rural areas in the 20th century (Kochanowicz, 2008). What follows, in the presence of 
high number of household members farmers may want to buy additional land in order to 
                                                        
9 The presence or absence of economies of scale in agriculture is a subject of vast and long discussion. 
For an overview of the debate on the relationship between farm size and productivity in the transition 
context see e.g. Gorton and Davidova (2004).  
10 For the discussion about the performance of credit markets in rural areas in Poland, see Petrick 
(2004).  
11 While ideally it would allow us to distinguish between household members in productive and 
unproductive age, our data do not allow us to follow this strategy.  
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solve the problem of diminishing returns to human capital (Feder, 1985). Finally, we control 
for human capital of the farm manager, as proxied by his age (in years) and education (a 
dummy equal to one for farmers with agricultural vocational education and equal to zero 
otherwise). Our baseline specifications always also include a full set of village fixed effects.  
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable, we estimate the model presented in 
(2) using a simple logit model. To test the robustness of our results to econometric 
specification and the estimation sample, we also assess the relationship of interest with the 
OLS. These models, however, could be inappropriate if there are other important 
determinants of farmers' propensity to purchase land that we do not observe. In that case the 
estimates from the logit/OLS model would be biased. As mentioned earlier, our dataset offers 
only limited access to various socio-economic household characteristics. For example, we do 
not observe households' total incomes which are likely to determine both the distaste for 
relative deprivation in land assets as well as the propensity to participate in land purchase 
transactions. To minimise potential problems that this could cause we resort to an 
instrumental variables strategy.  
More specifically, we try to instrument our relative deprivation index and look for variables 
that are likely to determine the level of individual's distaste for falling behind other members 
of the relevant reference group but are unrelated to farmers' propensity to purchase land 
except through their impact on relative deprivation. As the level of individual's relative 
deprivation is closely related to land inequality, our instrumental variables strategy draws on 
the land distribution at the village level. More specifically, we use three variables related to 
the village land Gini coefficient. In general, one can assume that, on average, individual's 
relative deprivation will be higher in villages with more unequal land distribution. However, 
the impact of land distribution on individual's propensity to purchase land will be different 
for small and large farms. For small farms unequal land distribution will strengthen their 
relative deprivation. For large farms, on the other hand, the opposite will happen and 
unequal land distribution should lower their relative deprivation. Accordingly, we use the 
following three instruments. The first one is the land Gini coefficient at the village level 
calculated at time t0, i.e. at the beginning of each four year period covered by our survey. The 
second and the third instruments are two interaction terms between the land Gini and a 
dummy distinguishing small and large farms, respectively. Small farms are defined as farms 
with land owned smaller than the 33rd percentile of the land distribution in a given village. 
Large farms in turn are those with land endowments larger than the 66th percentile of land 
distribution. Both these 'size dummies' refer to the year t0. Obviously, due to multicollinearity 
concerns, in these models we do not include village fixed effects.  
One additional argument that supports using land Gini coefficient at the village level as an 
instrument is that, especially at the beginning of transition, it could be regarded as 
exogenous. This is because of the phenomenon sketched above, namely that land markets 
operations under the communism were very rare. In consequence, farmers themselves had 
only limited tools and opportunities to affect the value of land Gini coefficient in their village.  
To take account of village-specific variance in the error term, all our models are estimated 
with robust standard errors.  
5. Results  
We start by reporting some descriptive results organised by years covered by our subsequent 
surveys. Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations for all variables that we use in 
our empirical work. It also provides basic definitions.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and definitions of the main variables used in the analysis 
 1988-1992  1992-1996  1996-2000 Definition 
 Mean St. Dev.  Mean St. Dev.  Mean St. Dev.  
Land purchase(t0; t0+4) 
 
0.058 0.234  0.091 0.288  0.072 0.259 A dummy =1 if land 
bought between t0 
and t0+4; and =0 
otherwise 
Relative dep. (t0) 
 
2.451 3.036  2.576 2.629  2.824 2.861 Individual’s relative 
deprivation index 
calculated over total 
land owned at t0 
Total farm area (t0) 
 
7.718 6.152  8.012 7.395  8.486 9.100 Total land utilized 
in hectares at t0 
Age (t0) 42.035 12.314  42.400 12.323  42.201 11.828 Farm manager’s age 
in years in t0 
Agricultural edu. (t0+4) 0.588 0.492  0.494 0.500  0.504 0.500 A dummy =1 if farm 
manager has 
agricultural 
education; and =0 
otherwise 
Family size (t0+4) 4.369 1.939  4.256 1.949  4.151 1.885 Number of people 
in a household 
Received credit(t0;t0+4) 0.226 0.418  0.389 0.487  0.423 0.494 A dummy =1 if hh 
received bank credit 
between t0 and t0+4; 
and = 0 otherwise 
Refused credit (t0;t0+4) 0.004 0.064  0.007 0.088  0.009 0.094 A dummy =1 if hh 
was refused bank 
credit between t0 
and t0+4; and = 0 
otherwise 
          
No. of observations 4127   4015   3855   
 
Table 1 shows several interesting things. Given our focus, it is important to note that the 
incidence of land purchases was relatively low and varied from 5.8% to 9.1% depending on a 
year. Further, the average initial relative deprivation grew over time, which suggests that over 
the analysed period land distribution became more unequal. This is consistent with the 
observation mentioned earlier, namely that during the transition period the dual character of 
agrarian structure has been gradually restored. At the same time a slight increase in the 
average total farm area, from 7.7 ha in 1988 to 8.5 ha in 1996, could be observed. Table 1 
shows also a considerable increase in the incidence of receiving credit. While in the period 
1988-1992 it was 22.6%, in the sub-periods covered by later surveys it accounted for 39% and 
42% respectively. We also observe an increase in the incidence of farmers being refused 
credit, although this change is of a much smaller magnitude (from 4% in 1988-1992 to 9% in 
1996-2000). The average age of farm managers and the average family size remained more or 
less stable over time.  
Further descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 2. This time however, we look at the 
average relative deprivation disaggregated into three categories of farms: those who sold 
(some of) their land; those who did not change (in any way) their land possessions and those 
who bought land on the market. This allows us to highlight the main differences between 
these groups and provides some insights on the potential impact that the relative deprivation 
could have exerted on farmers’ behaviour in land markets.  
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Table 2. Average relative deprivation in time t0 and land market participation in the period 
(t0;t0+4) 
 Farmer's behaviour in land markets in the period (t0; t0+4) 
 Sold (some of) their land No changes in land possession  Bought land 
t0 Average relative deprivation in t0  
1988 1.79 (115) 2.18 (3183) 3.56 (244) 
1992 2.03 (175) 2.48 (3020) 2.93 (382) 
1996 2.58 (186) 2.75 (2991) 2.81 (280) 
Note: Number of observations in brackets. Farms that increased or decreased their land holdings through 
ways other than sales/purchases not included. 
As reported, a majority of farmers in our samples were not involved in land markets 
transactions, regardless of the sub-period that we look at. For example, the share of farms 
that sold their land varied from roughly 3 to 5%. This is consistent with the official data for 
the whole country, which estimate the incidence of land sales to be lower than 10 percent.  
Most importantly however, figures presented in Table 2 indicate that the average initial 
relative deprivation was the lowest among those who later decided to sell some of their land 
and the highest among those who later decided for land purchases. This pattern is visible for 
all three waves of our survey, regardless whether we look at the 1988-1992 period, the 1992-
1996 period or the 1996-2000 period. Table 2 also shows that the differences in the average 
initial relative deprivation between various sub-samples of farms decreased over time. These 
two observations provide some support for the hypotheses formulated above. The former 
observation is consistent with the hypothesis that the initial relative deprivation may 
positively affect farmers’ propensity to buy land. The latter on the other hand lends some 
support to the hypothesis that this effect of relative deprivation is likely to weaken over time, 
possibly due to changes in rural and agrarian communities introduced by the ongoing 
modernisation and globalisation processes. Obviously, these observations are based on 
simple averages, and as a result, they certainly do not allow for making any definite 
statements.  
Before we show somewhat more sophisticated analysis of the data, it could also be noted that 
farms that bought land on the market differed from farms not involved in such transactions 
in several background characteristics.12 To mention but a few, farms that decided to buy land 
were on average larger than the rest in terms of both the acreage and the number of 
household members. Further, they more often took advantage of external funds and were less 
often refused by the bank. Finally, the managers from farms having increased their land 
endowments were also on average younger and more often held agricultural education. These 
differences seem to be quite persistent as they could be observed in each period covered by 
our samples, no matter whether we look at the beginning, the middle or the end of the 1990s.  
That said, we now move to provide some more systematic evidence on the determinants of 
land purchases in Poland during the first decade of the transition period. Table 3 below 
reports the results of our logit estimations. Columns (1), (3) and (5) can serve as our baseline 
specifications and refer to the consecutive waves of our survey, namely to the wave conducted 
in 1992 (with some information on 1988), the wave conducted in 1996 (with some 
information on 1992) and to the wave conducted in 2000 (with some information on 1996) 
respectively. In columns (2), (4) and (6) we allow for potential non-linearities in the effect of 
relative deprivation on farmers’ behaviour. The rationale for this is that for really small farms 
(i.e. those that are likely to have a high relative deprivation) relative deprivation 
considerations are likely to be replaced by concerns for mere survival (see also Stark and 
                                                        
12 These data are not reported owing to space constraints, but they may be obtained upon request.  
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Taylor, 1991 for a similar argument). In that case, we would expect the influence of the 
relative deprivation to follow an inverted U-shaped function.  
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 are in line with our expectations and provide some 
support for both hypotheses discussed above. More specifically, in all specifications we find a 
positive influence of the relative deprivation on farmer’s propensity to purchase land. This 
pattern however slightly varies over time. At the beginning of the transition period this 
impact seems to be non-linear and follows the inverted U-shape function (see the coefficients 
on the relative deprivation variables in columns (1) and (2)). At the later stages in turn, the 
relationship between the relative deprivation and the incidence of land purchases seems to be 
linear. This could be illustrated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the 
linear term of the relative deprivation variable and the coefficient on the squared term 
statistically indistinguishable from zero (see columns (3)-(6)). The results from Table 3 lend 
also some credence to our second hypothesis. The coefficients on the relative deprivation 
variables for specifications based on the 1996-2000 sub-sample (columns (5) and (6)) are of 
smaller magnitude than those reported for 1988-1992 and 1992-1996 sub-samples (columns 
(1) and (2) and columns (3) and (4) respectively). This in turn suggests that the impact of the 
relative deprivation considerations has at least partly weakened over time.  
As far as the other covariates are concerned, their impact on land purchases is in accordance 
with earlier expectations. In particular, we find a positive impact of total utilised area. This 
clearly shows that farmers' behaviour in land markets is driven not only by relative, but also 
by absolute land endowments.. In fact, the latter effect seems to be much larger in magnitude 
than the relative effect. The incidence of buying land is also higher among younger farmers 
and among households having received bank credit. The latter observation is in line with 
arguments emphasising the role of external financing in stimulating land markets' operation. 
We also find a positive impact of family size.   
In Table 4 we repeat this exercise but estimate the models with a simple OLS rather than the 
logit. This is done since the latter method, after including village fixed effects, effectively 
drops all observations in villages where no land purchase transactions took place. Thus our 
OLS estimates are based on a less restricted sample and could be seen as a robustness check 
of our baseline results to the estimation sample. 
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Table 3. Logit estimates of land purchases’ determinants  
Dep. var: a dummy =1 for households 
that bought land at some point 
between t0 and t0+4; and =0 otherwise 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
 (t0; t0+4)  (t0; t0+4)  (t0; t0+4)  
 1988-1992  1992-1996  1996-2000  
Land relative deprivation t0 0.101 0.212***  0.113*** 0.176*  0.0779** 0.0483  
 (0.069) (0.051)  (0.038) (0.100)  (0.036) (0.079)  
Land relative deprivation squared t0  
-
0.00259*** 
  
-0.00535 
  
0.00209 
 
  (0.00080)   (0.0076)   (0.0037)  
Total farm area t0 0.0350 0.0617***  0.0290*** 0.0323***  0.0409*** 0.0396***  
 (0.027) (0.016)  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.014) (0.014)  
Age t0 
-
0.0190*** -0.0181*** 
 
-0.0134** -0.0136** 
 -
0.0281*** 
-
0.0280*** 
 
 (0.0056) (0.0056)  (0.0057) (0.0057)  (0.0067) (0.0067)  
Agricultural education (t0+4) 0.127 0.159  0.232* 0.240*  0.210 0.205  
 (0.16) (0.16)  (0.12) (0.13)  (0.14) (0.14)  
Family size (t0+4) 0.168*** 0.173***  0.103*** 0.104***  0.155*** 0.154***  
 (0.039) (0.040)  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.039) (0.039)  
Received credit(t0; t0+4) 0.816*** 0.813***  0.998*** 1.014***  0.716*** 0.706***  
 (0.16) (0.16)  (0.18) (0.19)  (0.18) (0.18)  
Refused credit(t0; t0+4)    -0.176 -0.177  0.665 0.675  
    (0.67) (0.68)  (0.68) (0.67)  
Constant -4.550*** -5.400***  -3.674*** -3.846***  -4.356*** -4.274***  
 (0.79) (0.57)  (0.38) (0.47)  (0.48) (0.53)  
No. of observations 3757 3757  3659 3659  3308 3308  
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.156  0.136 0.136  0.153 0.153  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications include village fixed effects. 
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Table 4. OLS estimates of land purchases’ determinants  
Dep. var: a dummy =1 for 
households that bought land at 
some point between t0 and t0+4; 
and =0 otherwise 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
 (t0; t0+4)  (t0; t0+4)  (t0; t0+4)  
 1988-1992  1992-1996  1996-2000  
Land relative deprivation t0 0.0114*** 0.0200***  0.0109** 0.0139  0.0101** 0.0102  
 (0.0039) (0.0056)  (0.0046) (0.0088)  (0.0039) (0.0070)  
Land relative deprivation 
squared t0  -0.000198* 
  
-0.000260 
  -
0.00000864 
 
  (0.00012)   (0.00065)   (0.00037)  
Total farm area t0 0.00440** 0.00690***  0.00323* 0.00341*  0.00577*** 0.00577***  
 (0.0019) (0.0021)  (0.0017) (0.0018)  (0.0019) (0.0019)  
Age t0 
-
0.000766*** 
-
0.000733*** 
 -
0.000857** 
-
0.000858** 
 -
0.00126*** -0.00126*** 
 
 (0.00026) (0.00025)  (0.00036) (0.00036)  (0.00035) (0.00035)  
Agricultural education (t0+4) 0.00955 0.0115  0.0198* 0.0201*  0.0131 0.0132  
 (0.0083) (0.0082)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.0090) (0.0088)  
Family size (t0+4) 0.00763*** 0.00773***  0.00697*** 0.00704***  0.00778*** 0.00778***  
 (0.0021) (0.0021)  (0.0018) (0.0018)  (0.0027) (0.0027)  
Received credit(t0; t0+4) 0.0558*** 0.0554***  0.0833*** 0.0838***  0.0401*** 0.0401***  
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.011) (0.011)  
Refused credit(t0; t0+4) -0.101*** -0.101***  -0.0249 -0.0247  0.0500 0.0500  
 (0.022) (0.022)  (0.053) (0.053)  (0.068) (0.068)  
Constant -0.0874** -0.151***  -0.0338 -0.0420  -0.0466 -0.0469  
 (0.040) (0.047)  (0.041) (0.047)  (0.035) (0.038)  
No. of observations 4127 4127  4015 4015  3855 3855  
R2 0.09 0.09  0.10 0.10  0.10 0.10  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All specifications include village fixed effects 
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These new results confirm the findings of models presented in Table 3. That is, farmers with 
higher initial relative deprivation are more likely to purchase land. Moreover, for the first 
period observed (i.e. 1988-1992) the relationship is non-linear and takes the form of an 
inverted U-shape. Finally, the effect of the relative deprivation weakens with time.  
As a further robustness check, we also estimated a linear probability models on the same 
restricted sample as the one used in the logit estimates (not reported).13 This was done to 
check whether our baseline results are not driven by the choice of the econometric 
specification. The results of this exercise were again consistent with those reported in Table 
3.  
In a final strategy, we experimented with a two stage least squares approach where we treat 
the farmer’s relative deprivation in land assets as endogenous. This is done to see whether 
our results are not driven by some omitted variables. While the Durbin and Wu-Hausman 
tests cautiously suggest that our main variable of interest is exogenous, note that our data do 
not allow us to control for the level of households’ incomes. If, in turn, changes in land 
relative deprivation depend on incomes, which is likely to be the case, then our estimates 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 need not indicate a causal link between the individual’s relative 
deprivation and his/her activity on land markets. What follows, we instrument for the 
relative deprivation using the land Gini coefficient at the village level and its interactions with 
dummies distinguishing small and large farms (with medium-size farms acting as a reference 
group). As we show in Table 5 below (see the F-statistics and coefficients on land Gini 
variables in columns (1), (3) and (5)), our instruments are strongly correlated with the 
relative deprivation index for all sub-periods covered in this study and have the expected 
signs. Except for the specification for the period 1996-2000 they also pass the over-
identification test (see the p-values for the Sargan-Basman test).  
As far as the coefficients on the relative deprivation index from the 2SLS estimates are 
concerned, they are positive and of similar magnitude as the OLS estimates presented in 
Table 4. Thus they again suggest a positive association between farmers' relative deprivation 
in land assets and their propensity to purchase land. Not surprisingly however, these 
estimates are less precise. In fact, now the coefficient by relative deprivation variable is 
statistically distinguishable from zero only for the first sub-period studied (column 2). 
Overall though, we conclude that the instrumental variable results confirm our earlier 
findings and provide some support for the two hypotheses put forward in this study. 
Table 5. Instrumental variables estimates of land relative deprivation effect 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 (t0; t0+4)  (t0; t0+4)  (t0; t0+4) 
 
1988-1992  1992-1996  1996-2000 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Land relative 
deprivation t0  0.0169*** 
  
0.00726 
  
0.00204 
  (0.0064)   (0.0070)   (0.0056) 
Total farm area t0 -0.028 0.00382***  -0.0498*** 0.00229  -0.037*** 0.00475*** 
 (0.030) (0.0013)  (0.0095) (0.0014)  (0.0061) (0.0014) 
Age t0 -0.022*** -0.000594**  -0.0214*** -0.00122***  -0.024*** -0.00157*** 
 (0.004) (0.00029)  (0.0048) (0.00039)  (0.0063) (0.00039) 
Agricultural 
education (t0+4) -0.260 0.00740 
 
-0.525** 0.0190* 
 
-0.436** 0.0112 
 (0.244) (0.0088)  (0.20) (0.011)  (0.19) (0.0091) 
                                                        
13 We do not show these results for brevity reasons, but they may be obtained upon request.  
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Family size (t0+4) -0.091*** 0.00756***  -0.135*** 0.00643***  -0.0878** 0.00540** 
 (0.034) (0.0021)  (0.031) (0.0021)  (0.035) (0.0026) 
Received credit(t0; 
t0+4) 0.698*** 0.0562*** 
 
0.484** 0.0940*** 
 
-0.424** 0.0431*** 
 (0.162) (0.012)  (0.19) (0.014)  (0.21) (0.011) 
Refused credit(t0; 
t0+4) 0.905 -0.0557*** 
 
-1.004*** -0.0167 
 
0.208 0.0458 
 (0.772) (0.020)  (0.33) (0.048)  (0.47) (0.065) 
Village land gini  7.509***   11.20***   9.786***  
 (1.883)   (2.98)   (3.68)  
Village land gini * 
small farms 5.310*** 
  
4.251*** 
  
3.167*** 
 
 (1.128)   (0.77)   (0.70)  
Village land gini * 
large farms -2.612** 
  
-1.939*** 
  
-0.929 
 
 (1.058)   (0.56)   (0.60)  
Constant 1.284 -0.0377  0.662 0.0335  1.261 0.0458 
 (0.870) (0.033)  (1.09) (0.042)  (1.19) (0.040) 
         
First stage F-
statistic 13.033 
  
17.284  
 
11.210  
Sargan-Basman 
test, p-value 0.129 
  
0.889  
 
0.004  
No. of observations 4127 4127  4015 4015  3855 3855 
R2 0.23 0.03  0.30 0.05  0.24 0.06 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
6. Conclusions 
Land markets continue to occupy an important place in the agriculture and development 
economics. While a number of factors have been studied in relation to farmers' propensity to 
participate in land transactions, relatively little attention has been devoted to the role of land 
distribution. 
This paper tries to fill this gap and aims to contribute to the literature by investigating to 
what extent farmer's propensity to purchase land is related to his/her relative land 
endowments and interpersonal comparisons with his/her peers from the relevant reference 
group. This argument is well grounded in the economic theory that emphasises the fact that 
human behaviour is affected by comparison with neighbours. There also exists some evidence 
suggesting that land can be an important determinant of an individual's social and political 
position. As a result, land possession may be important not only in absolute but also in 
relative terms. In response to this, using household level data, we study the determinants of 
land purchases in Poland in the first decade of the transition period with the special focus on 
the impact of relative land endowments. We measure the dismay from having less land then 
others in one's own village by the index of relative deprivation.  
Overall, our results consistently show that the incidence of land purchases is positively 
associated with relative deprivation in land holdings. However, the intensity of the pattern 
changed over time. At the beginning of the transition period, the relationship was non-linear 
and assumed the form of an inverted U-shape function. At later stages, the coefficient on the 
squared term was statistically indistinguishable from zero. Second, the effect of relative 
deprivation at the end of 1990s was weaker than at the beginning or in the middle of the 
decade. This is probably due to the fact that the processes of modernisation and globalisation 
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have been profoundly reorganising agrarian and rural communities. What follows, over time, 
non-economic values of land might have lost some of its importance.  
That said, clearly, a question remains to what extent the relationship that we document 
reflects causality. As mentioned earlier, our data capture farm's socio-economic 
characteristics only to a limited extent. In effect, it may be argued that our main variable of 
interest captures also other unobservable factors. Nevertheless, the correlations that we 
report are quite robust. In effect, they show that the issues in question should receive some 
more attention. Thus, we hope that, even if we are not able to ascertain causality, the analysis 
which we present here can form a basis for further interesting inquiries. Additional 
robustness tests of findings reported could be one potential line of research. One issue that 
should be taken into account is to better control for potential effects related to economies of 
scale and to ensure that they are not captured by the relative deprivation measure. Providing 
evidence for other countries also seems promising. Finally, investigating the exact 
mechanisms through which the importance of relative deprivation may change over time is 
something that can importantly improve our understanding of the issues in question. 
Looking at the reorganisation of rural areas in response to processes of modernisation and 
globalisation could be a starting point for such an analysis. 
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